Duration of the ordinary legislative procedure for enacting laws: legislative timing as a structural justification for executive decrees

Abstract

This paper examines the duration of the ordinary legislative process in the Argentine National Congress, with the aim of providing elements that allow for a more precise assessment of when the issuance of emergency decrees (DNUs) by the Executive Branch is constitutionally permissible. The analysis is based on the assumption set forth in the Supreme Court’s Verrocchi decision, which permits recourse to DNUs when the need—and, in certain cases, the urgency—of a situation is incompatible with the normal timeframe required for the drafting and enactment of legislation. However, the absence of a guiding benchmark for the duration of that legislative process creates a gap that complicates the evaluation of such incompatibility. Through a twofold approach—both theoretical and empirical—this paper seeks to provide a reference point regarding the actual time that the ordinary legislative procedure typically requires. With that information in hand, the analysis then attempts to address an additional question: if the legislative process takes, on average, 272 days, would that delay—under the Verrocchi standard—be sufficient, by itself, to justify a DNU, thereby risking the practical erosion of its exceptional constitutional nature?